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Abstract: In this paper we investigate the impact of rising energy prices on technolog-
ical progress in the market for renewable energies. We use patent data of OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2010 and test the impact of oil prices on the innovative suc-
cess of countries; R&D, investment activities, electricity consumption, etc. are used 
as control variables. We compare several models such as Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG), Mean Group (MG), Count data (CD) and Dynamic fixed effects (DFE) models 
to distinguish short and long-term effects. The preliminary results show that increas-
ing energy prices seem to encourage innovation in renewable energy technologies. 
 
Keywords: Renewable Energy, Heterogeneous Dynamic Panel Data, Technological 
Progress 
 
JEL: Q55, C23 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper tries to provide evidence to the relationship between rising energy 
prices and technological progress in the market for renewable energies. The tech-
nology push and the demand pull approach, respectively, argue why we observe 
technological advances in industries. This still is an ongoing debate in the domain of 
evolutionary economics. The technology push argument claims that it is the ad-
vances in sciences that may induce the rate and direction of technological change  
in contrast to the demand pull approach which finds the drivers of technological 
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change in yet unsatisfied consumer needs. Both arguments received critique. The 
demand pull approach would be too broad as a concept to be useful. It would be 
inadequate to explain discontinuous change as the most important source of pro-
gress. Firms would not have sufficient capabilities to identify consumer needs, nor 
would they have the chance to choose from a ready-made stock of technological 
solutions to come to grips with consumer needs. It neglects the role of technological 
opportunities. The technology-push argument has been strongly criticized as it ig-
nores the role of prices as incentive to invest in new technologies. With respect to 
technology policies, as Nemet (2009) points out, a consensus has evolved that both 
types of instruments: demand-pull and technology-push policies should be pursued 
as market conditions (to which the demand-pull argument relates to) and techno-
logical opportunities (the basis for the technology push argument) have to coincide 
in order to lead to technological progress. On these grounds, we will focus on the 
demand pull argument and try to find out whether increasing oil prices (changing 
market conditions), as indicator for a steadily increasing demand for energy and the 
general perception of dwindling fossil energy resources, make countries increase 
their innovative activities in order to boost technological progress in alternative re-
newable energy technologies. Our work draws to a large extent on Nesta et al. 
(2014), Johnstone et al. (2010) and Nemet (2009). 
As in Johnstone et al. (2010) and Nesta et al. (2014) we apply negative binomial 
regression and extend our empirical exercise with estimators allowing for non-
stationary heterogeneous panels suggested by Blackburne and Frank (2007), which 
allows, besides traditional fixed-effects estimation, also the estimation of the mean-
group estimator (MG) (Pesaran et al., 1999) and the pooled mean-group estimator 
(PMG) put forward by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Thus we try to differentiate long-
run and short-run effects. 
In section II we refer to related work on the determinants of the technological 
progress in renewable energies. Section III presents the construction of our data 
and the methodological specifications we use. Results delivered by negative bino-
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mial count data models will be discussed in section IV. These results will be com-
pared with the results of dynamic heterogeneous panel estimation in section V. 
Section VI discusses primarily discusses shortcomings/caveats and concludes. 
 
II. RELATED WORK AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Economic growth hinges on the disposability of energy. As Stern (2011) points 
out, energy scarcity is a main constraint for economic growth. The industrial revolu-
tion impressively showed that the invention of new technologies that drove eco-
nomic growth was based on the usage of fossil fuels. This was key to substitute 
human labor for automated labor and thus enhance economic growth. Ever since 
the world economy has been growing, and so has the consumption of fossil fuels. A 
side effect of the steady increase in demand for fossil fuels has been rising energy 
prices. Standard textbook economics tells us about the consequences of increasing 
(relative) prices: all market participants will adapt their behavior. if fossil fuels be-
come more expensive relative to non-energy goods, (1) the demand for energy should 
go down, as consumers adapt their behavior. They try to substitute energy-intensive 
goods for non-energy goods. Quite similarly, (2) the supply side will change its be-
havior as well. Producers will try to innovate on energy-efficient products and tech-
nologies. They try to find less expensive substitutes (Newell et al., 1999). Last not 
least, (3) policy makers will participate in this process, too. Legitimizing their inter-
ventions by market failure, they carry out reforms to foster renewable energy 
sources and, at the same time, try to fight negative externatlities such as greenhouse 
gas emissions or the potential risks involved in nuclear waste as a by-product of 
electricity production. Hence, renewable energies should be attractive for all market 
participants: policy makers, consumers and suppliers. Renewable energies make us 
believe that they can be supplied at almost zero marginal costs and no negative ex-
ternalities. All what remains to be done is to develop and employ such new energy 
sources and to build the required infrastructure. 
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In traditional theory, markets should do the job, and as Newell et al. (1999) con-
cludes, rising energy prices should eventually lead to increasing innovative activities. 
This hypothesis we want to test empirically in this paper to answer the following re-
search question: 
Research Question: Do rising oil prices induce technological progress in renewa-
ble energies? 
Meanwhile, this topic of technological progress in renewable energies and its de-
terminants have been investigated intensively. Johnstone et al. (2010) and Nesta et 
al. (2014) give an excellent overview to this strand of literature. By and large, there 
are two fundamental options to boost technological progress – and this we can al-
ready conclude from Newell et al. (1999): either leave it to the market (Nesta et al., 
2014; Sanyal and Ghosh, 2012) or try to induce innovation by policy intervention 
(Nesta et al., 2014; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Johnstone et al., 2010). In many coun-
tries, market liberalization has intensified competition. Along with an increasing 
demand for renewable energy sources, due to a growing consumer awareness to 
environmental issues, innovative activity has risen. Many countries also carried out 
policy reforms to stimulate the innovation and adoption of renewable energy tech-
nologies (Johnstone et al., 2010; International Energy Agency, 2004). However, it is 
not obvious to what extent rising energy prices actually contribute to increasing in-
novative activities. If we can shed light on this, we will, at the same time, gain in-
sights on the question how well the price mechanism and the market for energy 
work as a whole. 
 
III. DATA 
As dependent variable to measure innovative activity in renewable energy tech-
nology, we collected patent statistics from European Patent Office Worldwide Pa-
tent Statistics Database PATSTAT (EPO, 2012) and focused on patents related to 
wind power technologies? Oil prices were retrieved from the Federal Reserves Eco-
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nomic Data (FRED )database. As further controls we included GDP, financial devel-
opment funding, and electricity consumption all downloaded from the World Bank 
database. Research and development data stem from the OECD database. The time 
span of annual data covered ranges from 1970 to 2010. 
Table I: DATA PROPERTIES AND SOURCES 
Variable Label Source Unit 
PatNumb # of patents PATSTAT 2012 counts 
GDP gross domestic 
product 
World Bank DB In Millions $ 
Fdev financial devel-
opment 
World Bank DB % of GDP 
R&D research and de-
velopment fund-
ing 
OECD database bn.$ 
OilPrice oil price Dow Jones & 
Company 
Ind $ 
ElecConsump Electrical Con-
sumption 
World Bank DB MWh 
 
A higher GDP stands for a country’s potential to generate technological progress 
in general. Industrialized countries manage to patent far more than less developed 
ones. As a further control we introduce financial development, which gives indica-
tions to the investment activity within a country. Financial development can be 
measured in various ways. The ratio of broad Money (M2) to GDP e.g. expresses the 
overall size of the financial intermediary of the country. Or, it can be expressed in 
terms of domestic credit to private sector to GDP (Hamdi et al., 2013; Fernandez 
and Galetovic, 1994; Calderón and Liu, 2003; Khan and Semlali, 2000). Due to miss-
ing data in the M2 indicator, we calculate financial development as the ratio of do-
mestic credit of the private sector to GDP. 
An increase in credit offered for private sector should lead to an increase in pa-
tents counts. R&D is included as a major input factor in generating technological 
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progress. Hence, a positive impact of R&D on patent counts should be expected. 
With the consumption of electricity patenting activities should also increase, as 
producers try to escape the shortage in its supply. Table I depicts the sources and 
units of our data. 
Table II: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
PatNumb 414 28.14 57.85 0 393 
GDP 11.555 1.467 8.023 15.186 504 
Fdev 87.047 43.39 20.749 227.753 501 
R&D 1.647 1.552 0.015 10.497 417 
OilPrice 24.477 15.358 3.4 72.400 504 
ElecConsump 0.878 0.545 0.142 2.559 504 
 
Table III: CROSS-CORRELATION TABLE 
 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) PatNumb 1.00    
(2) OilPrice 0.34 1.00  
(3) GDP 0.60 0.17 1.00 
(4) RD −0.07 0.27 −0.15 1.00  
(5) Fdev 0.60 0.36 0.58 0.00 1.00 
(6) ElecConsump −0.08 0.07 0.03 0.14 −0.02      1.00 
 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table II. With respect to patents, we confined 
the analysis on all world-wide patents on wind power. Table III shows the pairwise 
correlations between dependent variable and all covariates. From visual inspection 
multicollinearity seems not to be a problem. We also perform a multicollinearity test 
with the variance inflated factor (vif) and did not find multicollinearity among 
regressors. 
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In the following, negative binomial regressions provide first preliminary results with 
respect to our research question, whether oil prices have an effect on innovative ac-
tivities among in respective countries. 
 
IV. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS 
For a start, negative binomial regression were run. The dependent variable is 
count data and because of over dispersion, negative binomial regressions had to 
be preferred to a poisson model. We introduce variables sequentially to see 
whether there are changes in the estimates, when further covariates are consid-
ered. All covariates are instrumented by their one year lag. All models in this table 
are fixed-effects models taking a full set of year dummies into account. Model (1) 
in Table IV is a univariate regression of PatNumb on OilPrice. The correlation sug-
gests a positive relationship between rising oil prices and patent counts. With GDP 
as a first control, OilPrice remains positive and significant, and so does GDP. Model 
(3) takes additional control variables into account, that is, R&D, Fdev, and 
ElectConsump. The coefficients of OilPrice and GDP change little, they are positive 
and the correlation is significant to the 1% level. 
From the three variables introduced only Fdev has a significant, positive effect 
on the number of patents generated in a country. R&D and Fdev, however, are in-
significant. In model (4) all variables are logged. The fixed-effect model applied here 
does not change the basic relations ship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. Model (5) differs from model (4) in this regard, that all 
logged variables are in differences, in other words, model (5) regresses lagged 
growth rates. The interesting observation in this model is that all variables which are 
significant in the previous models become insignificant, whereas R&D and 
ElecConsump all of a sudden have a significant effect, a positive effect with respect 
to R&D and a negative effect with respect to ElecConsump. A change in R&D fund-
ing has a positive effect on patent counts, the absolute amount of R&D does not. 
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The same holds for ElecConsump. An positive change in electricity consumption 
explains a decreases in patent counts, the absolute value, however, does not. 
We are aware that these results are very rudimentary. But what we can infer is 
that there are differences in the time patterns. An increase in R&D funding as 
short-term impulse may enhance patenting and a short-term positive change in 
electricity consumption seems to reduce patent counts. Models (1) to (3) suggest 
that there might be a positive long-term relationship between oil prices, GDP and 
patent counts. As most of these variables are cointegrated, a robust conclusion can-
not be drawn from these results. Furthermore, spurious regression and endogeneity 
problems qualify these results even more. In order to face those problems, we apply 
dynamic heterogeneous panel models which offer alternative estimators in addition 
to the traditional fixed-effects estimator, i.e. the pooled mean-group estimator by 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) and the mean-group estimator by Pesaran et al. (1999) 
(Blackburne and Frank, 2007). 
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Table IV: REGRESSION 1: NEG. BIN (1-3), PANEL FIXED EFFECTS (4-5) 
Dependent Variable: PatNumb (model: 1-3) log (PatNumb) (model: 4-5) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OilPrice 0.038** 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.917*** -0.607 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.350) (0.531) 
GDP  0.003*** 0.002*** 0.397* -0.186 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.228) (0.424) 
RD   0.017 -0.002 -0.139 0.491*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.098) (0.148) 
Fdev   0.005*** 0.333*** 0.047 
   (0.001) (0.119) (0.244) 
ElectConsump   -0.113 -1.029 -5.207* 
   (0.237) (1.039) (2.829) 
Constant 0.192 0.641* 0.599 -2.730*** 1.792*** 
 (1.063) (0.366) (0.372) (0.674) (0.278) 
Observations 408 377 375 375 364 
Number of country1 14 14 14 14 14 
LL -1288 -1128 -1110 -255.4 -248.4 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Dynamic Heterogeneous Panel Models 
In this subsection, we introduce the general model of dynamic heterogenous pan-
el estimation as presented by (Blackburne and Frank, 2007) and will then adapt this 
model to our example. 
General Model 
In the general model it is assumed that the input data on time period , 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑇, 
and cross section groups, 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁 , can be estimated by an autoregressive 
distributive lag (ARDL) model (𝑝, 𝑞, . . , 𝑞𝑘) as in the following: 
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 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑  𝑝𝑗=1 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + ∑  𝑞𝑗=0 𝛿𝑖𝑗′ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the (𝑘 × 1)-vector of explanatory variables, 𝜇𝑖 the group specific effect, 𝜆𝑖𝑡 
the 𝑘 × 1 coefficient vectors and 𝜆𝑖𝑗 a scalar of constants. As 𝑇 is large enough each 
group can be estimated separately and the variables in eq:1 are cointegrated and  
𝐼(1), then the error term is an 𝐼(0) process for all 𝑖, thus the error correction equation 
can be reparameterized: 
  
𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + ∑  𝑝−1𝑗=1 𝜆𝑖𝑗∗ 𝛥𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑  𝑞−1𝑗=0 𝛿𝑖𝑗′∗𝛥𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2) 
 
for 𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑇 where the error correction speed of adjustment is 
parameter expressed by  
 𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − ∑  𝑝𝑗=1 𝜆𝑖𝑗), (3) 
  
 𝛽𝑖 = ∑  𝑞𝑗=0 𝛿𝑖𝑗 , (4) 
 
 𝜆𝑖𝑗
∗ = −∑  𝑝𝑚=𝑗+1 𝜆𝑖𝑚        𝑗 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑝 (5) 
 
and 
 𝛿𝑖𝑗
∗ = −∑  𝑞𝑚=𝑗+1 𝛿𝑖𝑚        𝑗 = 1,2, . . . , 𝑞 − 1 (6) 
 
assuming that the ARDL model in eq: 1 is stable in that the roots of  
∑  𝑝𝑗=1 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑗 = 1        𝑖 = 1,2, . . . ,𝑁  lie outside the unit circle, ensuring that the error 
correcting speed of adjustment term 𝜙𝑖 < 0. This indicate that there is a long run 
relationship between dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and controllers 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and is defined by 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = −(𝛽𝑖′/𝜙𝑖)𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 (7) 
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Adapted Model 
Adapting the general model from above to our case renders the long run function: 
 
  
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0𝑡 + 𝜃1𝑡𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑡𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑡𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑡𝐹𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑡𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡+ 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
  (8) 
 
where 𝑖 = 1,2, . . ,𝑁 is the number countries in our panel. 𝑡 = 1,2, . . ,𝑇 the time span of 
the panel, and 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 the real number of patents per country 𝑖 in period 𝑡. 
The variables are 𝐼(1) and cointergrated. Hence, the ARDL(1,1,1) dynamic panel 
specification of 8 is 
 
 𝛥𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜃0𝑖 + 𝜃1𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑖𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
 𝜃3𝑖𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃4𝑖𝐹𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃5𝑖𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡) 
 +𝛿11𝑖𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿21𝑖𝛥𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿31𝑖𝛥𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿41𝑖𝛥𝐹𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 +𝛿51𝑖𝛥𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (9) 
 
where 𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖), 𝜃0𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖1−𝜆𝑖, 𝜃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖0𝑖+𝛿𝑖1𝑖1−𝜆𝑖 , and 𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − 𝜆𝑖). The error correction 
speed of adjustment parameter is 𝜙𝑖 . The long run coefficients 𝜃1𝑖, 𝜃2𝑖 , . . . , 𝜃𝑁𝑖  are of 
primary interest. 
Estimators for heterogeneous slopes: So far the two introduced models do not 
handle macro panel problems. Micro panels, i.e. small T and large N , usually relies 
on either fixed- or random-effects estimators or a combination of both including in-
strumental variable estimators such as the Generalized Method Of Moments 
(GMM) put forward by Arellano and Bond (1991). It requires pooling individual 
groups and allows for different intercepts across groups. 
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As a rule, macro panels do not fulfill the assumption of homogeneous slope pa-
rameters (Phillips and Moon, 2000; Im et al., 2003). In contrast to micro panels the 
issue of non-stationarity plays a more important role. When T becomes large, it is 
necessary to pay more attention to serial correlation, when shocks whether tem-
porary or persistent bias estimation results. Traditional nonstationary panels with a 
short time span T have different characteristics (Phillips and Moon, 2000). Analyzing 
panel data with large T in this paper, we draw on techniques introduced by 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Blackburne and Frank (2007), which allow estimating 
nonstationary dynamic panels heterogeneous parameters across groups: the mean-
group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimators. 
The MG estimator depends on estimating N time series regressions and averag-
ing the coefficient (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). PMG is based on a combination of 
pooling and averaging coefficients (Pesaran et al., 1999). The dynamic fixed-effects 
estimator (DFE) is similar to the PMG estimator. Both restrict the coefficients of the 
cointegrating vector to be equal across all panels. The fixed-effects model addi-
tionally restricts the speed of the adjustment coefficient to be equal to the short-
run coefficients. 
 
V. DYNAMIC HETEROGENEOUS ESTIMATORS 
The regressions in this section refer to the heterogeneous panel techniques dis-
cussed above. All three estimators, PMG, MG and DFE, are applied in order to inves-
tigate short-run and long-run effects. The preliminary findings, depicted in Table IV, 
give some indications to possible short-run and long-run effects. Therefore, we con-
sider R&D and electricity consumption to also have short-run effects on innovative 
activities. In Table V all three model results are reported with two model versions 
each. 
In all models, model (6) to model (11), we introduced R&D and ElectConsump 
as short-term variables and also as 
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variables for the long run. Persistent R&D investments should, in the long run, 
increase the country stock of knowledge captured in new technologies and human 
capital. Further long-term explanatory variables are GDP, Fdev and OilP rice, the 
latter as the variable of our interest. Note that these variables are the same as in 
our negative binomial regressions above. The two model versions of each estima-
tion approach differ only in the (non-)inclusion of ElectConsump. Comparing all 
six models, we observe that the error correction coefficient (ec) is positive and sig-
nificant in all models. This suggests that the time series components are serially 
correlated. In model (6-9) R&D seems to have a short-term effect on patent 
counts.1 
                                                          
1  We used a five-year forward window of patent counts to take into account that the time span between innova-
tive activities and the resulting actualization of innovation can take several years. Compare e.g. Nesta (2008). 
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Table V: REGRESSION 2: POOLED-MEAN-GROUP(PMG) (6-7), MEAN-GROUP 
(8-9) AND DYNAMIC FIXED-EFFECTS (10-11) 
Dependent Variable: PatNumb 
  (6) 
PMG 
(7) 
PMG 
(8) 
MG 
(9) 
MG 
(10) 
DFE 
(11) 
DFE 
sh
or
t 
ru
n 
ec 1.018*** 1.018*** 0.875*** 0.842*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.114) (0.124) (0.011) (0.011) 
D.RD 5.784** 5.605** 18.555** 14.736** -0.696 -0.836 
 (2.475) (2.468) (7.812) (6.446) (2.238) (2.249) 
 D.ElectConsump 131.473 133.617 -477.713 -485.562 -15.419 -13.202 
  (108.852) (109.555) (499.072) (488.092) (75.411) (75.550) 
 OilPrice 0.177*** 0.168** -0.486 -1.116 0.546** 0.557** 
  (0.065) (0.06) (0.835) (1.122) (0.256) (0.256) 
 GDP2 -0.084*** -0.079*** -2.285 -2.283 -0.181*** -0.184*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (1.746) (1.575) (0.021) (0.022) 
lo
ng
 r
un
 RD 2.127*** 2.031*** 34.015 40.263 -2.041 -1.818 
 (0.434) (0.471) (22.485) (32.712) (1.528) (1.560) 
Fdev 0.036* 0.043* -0.880 -1.242 -0.237*** -0.258*** 
  (0.020) (0.023) (1.413) (2.512) (0.071) (0.076) 
 ElectConsump  -4.498***  -274.220  12.671 
   (1.364)  (223.733)  (17.875) 
  Constant 3.234 0.309 -78.869 -137.879  
   (6.235) (6.131) (66.371) (106.134)  
  Observations 286 286 286 286  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Electricity consumption has no significant explanatory power. Looking at the 
long-run coefficients OilP rice has a positive effect on patent counts, a prelimi-
nary result which corroborates our research hypothesis that it should have such 
an effect on innovative activities. In models (8) and (9), this effect vanishes, that 
is, it becomes insignificant. GDP has a negative long-run effect on patenting in 
renewable energy in all six models, although in model (8) and (9) this effect is 
insiginifcant. A possible explanation could be that economic growth is uncoupled 
from the progress in renewable energy technologies. To recall, we only consider 
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wind power patents so far, which gives us a rather blurred picture of the role of 
renewable energy technologies. The sign of its coefficient is consistently negative. 
The reported long-run effects of R&D investments deliver only in model (6) and 
(7) a positive significant effect. In all other modells it is insignificant. The sign of 
financial development (Fdev) is ambiguous. In model (6) and (7). Fdev, i.e. the 
share of credits to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, appears as a posi-
tive driver of patenting in this field. In model (8) and (9) this effect is insignificant 
and in modell (10) and (11) we observe flipped and significant signs. Electricity 
consumption (model 7) has a significant and negative long-run effect on patent 
counts. When comparing model (6) and (7), we observe that introducing 
ElecConsump does not change a lot with regard to the other coefficients. So far, 
this can be interpreted as an indication for these two models’ robustness. 
There is no need for denying that the results in Table V are mixed. This calls 
for further research efforts on our side. Nevertheless, the Hausman test suggests 
that the PMG estimator is to be preferred over the MG and DFE estimator. This is 
good news with regard to the effect of OilP rice, R&D and Fdev. All thress are 
positive, which is consistent to the results in the negative binomial regressions 
above. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION, CAVEATS AND CONCLUSION 
At the current stage of this paper, there is not much need for discussing the 
results any further. This is pretty much work in progress and there are many 
shortcomings and caveats which have to be considered as we progress. 
From an econometric stance, more tests have to be performed to understand 
the characteristics of the panel time series. This hopefully sheds more light on the 
inconsistencies identified. A further option is to compare the models with other 
models such as a pre-sample mean count data specification used in Nesta et al. 
(2014). It is conceivable that this could explain the negative sign of the long-run 
effects of GDP. Moreover, the paper by Nesta et al. (2014) also gives good ad-
vice on further factors that have an impact on innovative activities in the field of 
renewable energies. For example, to weight patent counts by patent family or by 
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their triadic relationship to adjust for patent quality make a difference. Industry 
dynamics play an important role, too. Many countries liberalized their energy 
markets in recent years. This has increased market competition and the ongoing 
technological progress in renewable energies driven by small start-up firms 
change the industry dynamics (Klepper, 1997, 1996; Abernathy and Utterback, 
1978). This scrapes off a some of the market power of large incumbent firms. An-
other aspect is the role of global warming that has risen consumer awareness to 
environmental issues. The demand for renewable energies has been steadily in-
creasing Nesta et al. (2014). Even households become energy producers, as is the 
case in Denmark where the majority of wind power plants are owned by house-
holds Hadjilambrinos (2000). From the viewpoint of policy making, policy re-
forms adapt the institutional frame of energy markets to the new needs. Con-
sumers are drawn in to participate in energy production. An example for having 
introduced such demand side policies is the US (Loiter and Norberg-Bohm, 1999). 
Finally, the interplay between industrial change and policy reforms needs attention 
in our work, too. Nesta et al. (2014) provide evidence for such kind of 
endogeneity issues. 
For the time being, it remains our positive attitude that we will find convincing 
evidence of the oil price impact on countries’ innovative activities in renewable 
energies. 
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